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Abstract 
 
The paper examines the normative foundations of EU foreign and security policy 
against the context of one of the world’s most intractable disputes, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  Recent scholarship has developed a thesis that the European 
Union – perhaps uniquely – is a ‘normative power,’ an international actor dedicated to 
the export of values and norms rather than (or in addition to?) the pursuit of interests. 
This generates a number of questions, at perhaps the core of which is under what 
conditions and in what circumstances can and does the EU use a strategy of norm 
export and to what effect? The aim of this paper is thus to assess how EU foreign and 
security policy is pursued on the ground, how EU officials perceive their own role and 
– crucially - how they are seen by others within this particular peace process. The 
paper concludes that there is only limited evidence for the thesis of the Union as a 
normative power and that the explanatory power of rationalism and instrumentalism 
thus remains considerable. However, the very fact that many officials – from both the 
EU institutions and the Member States – have internalised core common norms is 
testimony to the changes that have occurred in national foreign-policy making.  
 
Foreign Policy and Ideas 
 
What can a people or set of peoples believe about themselves and how might this 
effect the way in which they relate to others? In what ways do perceptions of history, 
language, culture, race, identity and nationality impact upon global politics? These are 
difficult questions for scholars of International Relations since the dominant 
assumptions that traditionally govern much of the discipline do not lend themselves 
easily to addressing such queries.  
 
One key criterion that locks together most traditional analyses of inter-state relations 
is the assumption of rationality. Here traditional accounts look at the policy choices 
available to state actors and assume that such actors – through bureaucratic and/or 
political processes - adjudicate as best they can between an available array of policy 
choices using some form of a cost/benefit analysis. Depending upon theoretical 
choice, such an analysis might assess the cost/benefit in terms of absolute or relative 
gains accruing either to the state, to the individual actor or to the elite that the actor 
serves and represents.  In any event, behavioural laws assist in the dissection of state 
decision-making processes and then offer explanations as to why states ‘act’ in the 
way that they do.      
 
This analytical agenda – in which the motivations of actors are deemed to be rational 
and open to quantifiable scrutiny – then raises a series of difficult questions. To what 
extent – if at all – might foreign policy be constructed or constrained by collective 
belief structures, socially constructed norms and collective identity? In seeking to 
address this and other related questions, an increasing number of scholars in recent 
years have challenged the ‘rationalist’ approach and instead have contributed to what 
has come to be known as a ‘constructivist turn’ in our understanding of foreign policy 
and international relations.1 This has entailed an attempt to extend the focus of 
international relations beyond the search for behavioural laws to include consideration 
of ‘ideas, norms, culture – the whole socially constructed realm (which) are 
inaccessible to an empiricist form of knowledge.’2 This approach is now well 
established in the fields of both International Relations and European Studies and it 
allows for a different interpretation of the motivations driving international actors’ 
policies.3 When it comes to the European Union, this sui generis organisation has 
been labelled a normative actor rather than a purely rational one.4  
 
If the European Union is to be characterised as ‘normative actor’ then there must be 
scope for identifying how the Union’s norms are exported and the extent to which 
these norms are then internalised by the actors to which they are directed. We may 
also be in a position to identify the conditions necessary for the successful export of 
such norms.  
 
Perhaps the biggest challenge in such an endeavour is to demonstrate the influence of 
norms. For the purposes of this paper, we shall be considering a distinction between 
norm export and norm internalization.  The means by which norms are exported is 
significant.  One might, for example, distinguish between a ‘soft’ export and a ‘hard’ 
export. The soft export is the capacity of the international actor to represent a different 
way of doing things that is then seen as so attractive that other actors choose to follow 
its lead and/or example.5  For the European Union this is often seen as its most 
significant power, rooted in the representation of its own history of integration as 
being one of overcoming conflict and which is best exemplified by the success of the 
enlargement process.6  A ‘hard’ export, by contrast, is the Union’s capacity to 
engender normative change using traditional tools of international politics – from 
diplomacy through to the use, or threatened use, of force.   
 
Hard normative exports can be identified through the Union’s use of its foreign policy 
tools including the Common Commercial Policy, development policy, humanitarian 
aid, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). The latter two are often viewed as being most analogous to a 
traditional state’s foreign and security policy, encompassing – in an EU context – the 
issuance of diplomatic demarches and political declarations, imposing sanctions, 
offering trade and aid deals, engaging in diplomatic intervention (hosting 
negotiations, peace talks or appointing special envoys) and – with the development of 
ESDP – offering the provision of peacekeeping troops and/or police missions.  One 
notable feature of both the Union’s Common Commercial Policy and its policy 
towards development cooperation and even humanitarian intervention, is the 
increased use and application of rules of conditionality so as to provide for assurances 
– if not guarantees – on good governance and human rights.  This is most obvious in 
the Union’s development cooperation activities but it has also been applied – or at 
least attempted – in the Union’s dealings with wealthy industrialised and democratic 
states such as Australia.  
 
In the Middle East, the Union faces, perhaps, its greatest challenge in seeking to 
extend its pacific norm model to a region of active conflict and deep-rooted hostilities. 
There has, to date, been considerable resistance on all sides, and not inconsiderable 
resentment against the kind of normative ambitions pursued by the Union vis a vis the 
putative ‘partners’ in the tortured Arab-Israeli peace process. The Middle East also 
represents a traditional case study in EU foreign and security policy failure.  If any 
evidence of successful normative export and/or internalization can be adduced here, 
then its general salience may be said to have considerable potential elsewhere.  
 
Normative bases in EU Foreign Policy 
There remains an active debate on the nature of the European Union as an 
international actor. The Union is neither a traditional international organization nor a 
state. This, however, makes the analysis all the more challenging since it implies that 
there is no direct comparator against which the Union’s international capacity can be 
contrasted – and for any social scientist such a proposition is problematic at best. 
Many, however, do insist that the Union is unique– a new kind of hybrid structure that 
is neither domestic nor international – an entity that challenges our traditional 
Westphalian understanding of sovereignty, statehood and the international system.7  
 
Within this new system, the Union is also frequently seen as having forged a political 
community from diverse national starting points and which has subsequently created a 
collective identity founded upon a distinct set of values and norms.  This has thus 
“Europeanised” the member states through shared experience and the instantiation of 
common procedures and a convergence of some values.8 This has been represented as 
member states having ‘created a notion of belonging to a community within a 
particular (international) order.’9 As regards foreign policy, Ian Manners cites the 
Union’s own dedication to ‘certain principles that are common to the member 
states.’10 These norms have then been institutionalized into the very structures and 
policies of the Union. These norms, in turn, have a constitutive effect that defines the 
Union’s international identity.11  
 
One of the core norms, based in part upon the Union’s own ‘story’ of its roots, 
construction and even purpose, is that of ‘peace’. The Union’s own narrative is that it 
was established to provide for an historic reconciliation of France and Germany, 
founded upon the withdrawal of national control over two key components of 20th 
century warfare: steel and coal. That founding bargain, which successfully 
domesticated security, was subsequently extended to European states struggling 
towards democracy following periods of dictatorship (Spain, Portugal and Greece) 
and is now being applied upon a continental scale to the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe as well as the Mediterranean. Indeed, in Turkey’s application for 
membership the Union is perhaps seeking to apply this historic rubric to civilisational 
reconciliation between the worlds of Christendom and Islam. This ‘peace’ project has, 
over time, been increasingly defined in Kantian terms of a particular kind of 
‘democratic peace’ in which values such as human rights, a dedication to the rule of 
law, liberal democracy and a broadly multilateral approach to interstate problem 
solving have come to the fore.    
 
These values have been specified and expanded in subsequent iterations of EU treaty 
change. The Maastricht Treaty, for example, stated that the objectives of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) included the pursuit of ‘democracy and the rule 
of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ which was itself 
echoed in another reference to policy which ‘shall contribute to the general objective 
of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of 
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ Later, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
insisted that the European Union was ‘founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States.’  
 
There is a long – if disparate – record of attempts to characterise the European Union 
as an international actor. One of the earliest, dating back to the 1970s, was Francois 
Duchêne’s conceptualization of the then European Communities, as being a civilian 
power.12 This was swiftly contested first by Galtung’s proposition that in fact the 
Communities were a ‘superpower’ in the making13 and later Hedley Bull’s insistence 
that a ‘civilian power’ was an oxymoron and that Europe had to aspire to becoming a 
military power if it was successfully to pursue its international ambitions.14 
 
More recently, the threads of Duchêne’s approach have been reconsidered by a new 
generation of scholars who insist that the Union’s uniqueness is grounded in its 
normative foundations and its efforts to pursue these normative ambitions outside the 
Union’s borders.15 These analysts focus upon the uniqueness of the Union as an 
international actor contrasting it most frequently with the United States - and almost 
always, to the latter’s disadvantage. The Union, it is argued, has a very unique 
institutional structure, has an approach to international affairs that is firmly rooted in 
multilateralism and has, in sum, developed an alternative approach to politics, turning 
away from old fashioned power politics and instead drawing upon the wells of 
international law, norms, rules, cooperation and integration. It is this ‘normative’ 
power that the Union now exerts.  The impact of this is – in the minds of some – to 
create a vision of the Union as a ‘post-modern state’ or, in a less sympathetic light, a 
rather smug and self-satisfied Kantian island of perpetual peace shielded from 
international realities by a more traditionally power-oriented ally (Kagan 2002).16  
 
While extending this post-modern condition and/or enlarging this island of peace to 
encompass much of central and Eastern Europe has been successful to date the 
Union’s effort to export its normative condition beyond its immediate neighbourhood 
has been more problematic.    
 
This paper’s purpose is to consider EU policy towards the Middle East Peace Process 
and, specifically, the significance of norms, values and identity in both its 
development and execution. In particular it seeks to assess the extent to which, if at 
all, European policy is being driven by the values and norms ascribed under the rubric 
of a ‘normative power’ and the extent to which scope conditions allow for the success 
of this endeavour. To take this analysis any further, one must assume that CFSP is 
more than an expression of lowest common denominator politics and proceed on the 
basis that its sum is greater than the addition of its individual parts. Taking that 
assumption on board, there are at least three scenarios one might envisage arising 
from an empirical study of policy on the ground in the Middle East. First, one might 
find that European policy in this area is a creature of an ideal-type of ‘complex 
interdependence’ where an institutional regime has been established by self-regarding 
and rational states through which national interests are pursued.17 The role of the state 
in the first instance is to aggregate competing domestic interests, to establish a 
hierarchy of those interests and then to set about - alongside their European partners - 
to maximise their relative gains through a complex system of collective bargaining. 
This process of negotiation - which in the European context is highly institutionalised 
- establishes the norms of the resulting EU regime vis a vis Middle East policy.  These 
norms are in turn fed back into the EU system for application and enforcement. Our 
data in this case should underline the conditional nature of EU policy bargains, should 
illustrate policy difficulty and delay when faced with sudden shifts or challenges from 
other policy actors and we should be able to identify clear member state policy leaders 
or even consortia of such leaders, who drive and direct the EU policy process.   
 
Alternatively, one might instead find that while national governments remain key 
actors they do not exclusively monopolise the decision or policy-making processes of 
the Union. First, it is argued that decision making is a shared competence of actors at 
different levels of the Union; second, that collective decision making entails an 
inevitable loss of control on the part of member state governments and third, that the 
arena of political debate is not the sum total of 'nested' national debates but must 
accommodate trans-national actors and sub-national actors working across member 
state boundaries. Here, our data should identify a range of key policy actors beyond 
the member states, including the Commission, the European Parliament and other 
trans-national or even sub-national policy groups. There should also be some clear 
evidence of effective policy flexibility and a rapid response to external policy 
challenges as well as a clearly developed sense of collective interests.  
 
Finally, one might find that the key dynamic within policy development is not just 
one of bargains and balancing expressed ‘interests’ but one of evolving beliefs and 
norms. Here, a process of Europeanisation is understood to be in part a process of 
transformation in which the self-regard and beliefs of the state actors evolve and have 
an impact upon the construction of the interests that they pursue. In any event, policy 
actors are in the business of constructing, pursuing and implementing policy norms 
and collective values deriving from this evolving political system.   
 
This model would underscore much of the agenda of those seeing the Union as a 
normative power. Our data should, therefore, offer us evidence of new norms deriving 
from collective action at the EU level. These would be expected to be both 
regulative18 as well as constitutive.19 The power of such norms would underline the 
extent to which - even without explicit regulatory mechanisms – they were observed 
in both day-to-day practice and in conditions of crisis. These norms would in turn 
suggest that EU foreign policy was at least in part founded upon a normative base of 
shared mission and identity. 
 
There should also be evidence that national interests had undergone some evolution.  
Rather than see such interests as being chips in an especially complex poker game - 
interests would change through participation in the game itself.  Interests would 
therefore be developed/constructed endogenously (i.e. within) the collective policy 
process rather than being established exogenously (i.e. formulated within the domestic 
sphere and then brought to the negotiating table). This would also suggest the creation 
of common European norms driving the conduct and execution of EU foreign policy. 
 
Manners identified five core norms within the corpus of EU treaties, foreign policy 
declarations, policies and practices.20 These core norms (peace, liberty, democracy, 
rule of law and human rights) are said to underpin the Union’s acquis communautaire 
and acquis poltique. In addition, he posits four additional but more contested ‘minor 
norms’ (social progress, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good 
governance) as being significant inputs to the construction of EU foreign policy.  
These are not simply declaratory positions but are argued to be the constitutive 
foundations of an EU foreign policy which cannot rely upon the substance of 
sovereignty and statehood but which must reach into the cognitive core of policy 
makers at both EU and national level. 
 
It is then from this foundation of norms that EU foreign policy then emerges. Thus, 
the pursuit of the Union’s material interests and the interplay within EU foreign 
policy debates should be seen as a resolution and contestation, respectively, of 
underlying norms. This study is then an analysis of the extent to which, if at all, these 
underlying norms are contested within and represented effectively by the European 
Union and its member states with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 
The Normative Role and Impact of the EU in the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict 
The argument of this paper is that if the Union is to be viewed as a normative power – 
with the will to exercise such power – then there must be evidence of EU influence, of 
successful norm export and norm internalisation. If no such evidence exists, then the 
Union is either not a normative power or it has insufficient capacity successfully to 
export same and see these internalised. 
  
The Middle East Peace Process has long been a political priority for European policy-
makers. This very sensitive issue occupies therefore centre stage when it comes to 
Common and Foreign Security Policy. The importance of the Mediterranean, the 
perception that common interests existed in the field of economic co-operation and 
the solution of the Palestinian problem in fostering better relations with the Muslim 
world led the EU to establish a multilateral framework where all these issues could be 
approached and discussed.21 This multilateral framework, formalised in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, sees the European Union and its member states building 
co-operative links with countries on the other bank of the Mediterranean in three key 
sectors. The first pillar of this agreement is a political and security partnership with 
an emphasis on the rule of law, respect for human rights and pluralism. The second 
and most detailed pillar is an economic and financial partnership, which attaches 
importance to ‘sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a 
view to achieving the objective of creating an area of shared prosperity.’22 The third 
pillar of the agreement is a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs with an 
emphasis on the rejection of the notion of the clash of civilisations in favour of a 
dialogue between cultures.  
 
While not primarily concerned with it, there is in the Declaration a commitment of all 
participants to the ‘realisation of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in 
the Middle East.’23 The Barcelona Process was meant to provide yet another forum 
for both Israeli and Palestinian policy-makers to work in a multilateral environment 
on political and economic affairs affecting the whole region. Despite its successes in 
improving relations in the Mediterranean in terms of trade and co-operation on 
matters such as immigration and regional military security, the breaking out of the 
second Intifada in September 2000 has had negative repercussions on the whole 
process. This is recognised at EU level and in a paper on regional strategy for the 
years 2002-2006 it has been highlighted that ‘recent developments in the Middle East 
have led to a virtual stalemate in the peace process, which in turn have impacted on 
the work of the Barcelona Conference in the creation of a favourable climate for the 
Middle East Peace Process.’ Some argue that such stalemate is also the result of the 
inability of the EU to utilise the ‘Euro-Mediterranean partnership to generate 
dynamics more favourable to the peace process.’24 The weight of the EU has been 
instead brought to bear to gain inclusion in the Quartet.25 
 
In spite of these difficulties, the EU is still present in the region and the Commission 
is engaged in the following activities: 
• High representatives of the Commission engage with the regional parties with 
a view to promoting progress in the Peace process. 
• It implements CFSP Measures. 
• It supports the EU’s Special Envoy. 
• It represents the EU in the multilateral track of the Middle East Peace Process. 
• It participates in international donors’ conferences. 
• It is responsible for the preparation and implementation of assistance 
programs. 
• It manages regional economic co-operation schemes and engages with Israelis 
and Palestinians in an economic dialogue.  
 
These tasks are carried out through two delegations in the region: the European 
Commission’s Delegation to Israel and the European Commission Technical 
Assistance Office to the West Bank and Gaza. Given that it is the people working in 
these offices who are the ‘faces and voices’ of the European Union in the region, the 
focus of this study is on how they perceive their work. Since we are talking about 
identity, it should be stressed that the construction of it is context-dependent. This 
means that the implementation of CFSP policies and the beliefs behind them may be 
different in Jerusalem/Gaza and Brussels. The ‘agency’ factor becomes very relevant 
to determine who is Europe and who speaks for Europe and we paid attention to the 
voice in the field.  
 
Exporting Norms? 
One of the most significant aspects of CFSP in the Middle East Peace process is the 
absence from official discourse of the word ‘interest’ associated to the word 
‘European.’ While this might be a conscious rhetorical device, its absence may also 
be indicative of a deeper mistrust of traditional foreign policy-making. The word 
'interest' appears only when associated to the adjective 'common' to define that 
interests cannot be promoted or defended if only one side benefits because in the 
longer term this will create resentment and a contestation of preceding actions. The 
value of the word ‘interests’ is in the meaning it has for EU foreign policy makers, as 
it represents a higher form of the national interest to become an international one, 
where all parties share core values and therefore actions abiding by the same rules. 
This signifies that the deepening Europeanisation of certain policies has an impact on 
traditional notions of ‘national interest’ that member states have and encourages an 
‘identity change’ among them through the concept of a shared European interest 
influenced by different norms and values.    
 
Most documents, declarations and accounts of personal interviews emphasise the 
strategic relevance of the area to the Union, but it also emerges quite clearly that 
foreign policy has already moved beyond the narrow interpretation of ‘strategic 
relevance’ with its association to zero-sum games towards a new dimension based on 
comprehensive co-operation and solidarity. This goes beyond the liberal 
understanding and belief in multilateralism to actually take the founding values of the 
EU as the supreme norms that need to be propagated not to defend the cause of the 
EU, but to recast the Middle East in the normative mould of Europe. The identity 
acquired by the European Union through its process of integration is the driving force 
behind EU foreign policy in the region.  This particular identity then filters down to 
the member states. One clear example of this is the 2004 Franco-German agreement 
over the opening of a shared cultural centre in Ramallah, which symbolises at once 
the unity of the European Union and the possibility of reconciliation that Palestinians 
and Israelis should aim for.26  
 
The core norms identified by Manners and the emphasis of them as the foundational 
values of the European Union are not simply rhetorical devices, but constitute a basis 
for action. European policy-makers in the region see themselves as the representatives 
of these values and norms rather than representatives of an institution and their 
actions, consequently, reflect these normative foundations. The European delegations 
and institutions in the area are the means through which these values can be promoted 
and not the entity, which decides that certain values should be promoted because they 
advance a specific European Interest. To a certain extent the traditional roles of 
entities dictating the line to be followed and the policy makers following are reversed, 
as the policy-maker sees him/herself as the defender or promoter of ideas, which are 
not the reflection of sovereignty or statehood. Given that member states are bound by 
this common framework, they also tend to put aside their ‘national’ differences to 
support what EU agencies do in the area. 
 
In one particular interview with a senior EU policy-maker, this point emerged quite 
strongly. Without being solicited, the interviewee launched into a passionate defence 
of the values upon which the European Union was founded and the need to use the 
example of these values in the region.27 In fact, there seems to be little doubt that the 
experience of the creation and the expansion of the European Union is the driving 
force behind the efforts of EU foreign policy in the region to solve the conflict. The 
role of CFSP is that of an external actor attempting to convince the parties in conflict 
that by looking at the EU’s experience it is possible to come to a peaceful and 
mutually beneficial solution. The EU does heavily rely on the values it was founded 
on and the norms it developed over time to devise its foreign policy in the region. In 
the words of the Head of the Delegation in Gaza and the West Bank: ‘if the French 
and the Germans were able to come to understand that their future laid in co-
operation, there is no reason why the same reasoning cannot be achieved in this 
region.’28  
 
This obviously leads to two different types of difficulties. One is the ‘misplaced’ 
idealisation of how Europe and a European identity emerged. In the creation of the 
‘mythical values’ of Europe and in the selective history of how the EU became to be 
what it is today, it is forgotten that when it was created there was an existing ‘peace’ 
and there were both external security guarantees provided by the United States and a 
common external threat in the form of the Soviet Union. These conditions do not exist 
today in the Middle East. However, the crucial point here from the point of view of 
the internalisation of norms is that this very partial account of how Europe came into 
being is perpetuated within EU policy-making circles and does become the whole 
story. What is important to underline is that by eliminating some relevant factors from 
the construction of the European model, EU policy-makers have created an idealised 
account of their own identity that they believe in and attempt to export. What follows 
is that the policies in the region derived from this idealised account may not be 
working precisely because some crucial factors have been left out from the official 
report of the identity-building process.  
 
The second difficulty is the existence of competing ‘interests’ within the EU. While 
EU officials may have internalised norms, as documents and interviews show, the EU 
is also constituted by member-states pursuing their own separate policies. This 
indicates that there may be two games taking place at the same time and the 
contradictions generated by these conflicting actions undermine the EU’s credibility 
and norm-exporting power. It is no coincidence that top EU officials showed a degree 
of frustration toward EU member states and their ‘independent’ activities in the 
region.   
 
At a general level, it can be argued that there is a considerable gap between the 
‘internalised’ norms, how much they actually filter down to member states and the 
ability to promote them successfully. This may be due to the ‘over-idealisation’ of the 
making of a peaceful Europe and to the competition that the EU is subjected to from 
member-states.       
 
It’s the economy…stupid!  
The impact of norms in the development of EU foreign policy is evident in the 
instruments used to make the policy effective. As indicated previously, the 
Commission ‘manages regional economic co-operation schemes and engages with 
Israelis and Palestinians in an economic dialogue.’ This is the most important activity 
of the EU and a very simple explanation was given for this: ‘sound and successful 
economic co-operation will ultimately lead to political progress.’29 The work of the 
European Union in the region is therefore focused on economic development. Along 
with the essential role played in funding the reform of the Palestinian Authority, 
economic development is the real priority.  
 
Simply looking at the list of tasks that the EU has, it emerges that most of them have 
an economic dimension. In this respect there are a number of elements that should be 
highlighted. First of all, the Commission attempts not only to help the Palestinians 
achieve a respectable level of economic development by funding a wide variety of 
projects in the Occupied Territories, but tries to link the economy of these Territories 
with that of Israel – attempting to create an economic interdependency. Through the 
management of regional economic co-operation schemes, the EU is involved in 
building bridges between the two parties highlighting the positive outcomes of co-
operation. Secondly, the Union itself does not directly manage many of the projects it 
funds, but rather contracts them out to international and local non-governmental 
organisations, so as to maximise the involvement of the local population. Thirdly, the 
EU actively promotes economic agreements that result in association agreements with 
the two political entities in order not only to foster its own commercial agenda but 
also to have both entities participating in the same policy arena. Given that the 
potential of the Euro-Mediterranean region to become a leading economic area is 
enormous, the benefit of economic co-operation is highlighted. All this would confirm 
that the EU is indeed a normative power, but this policy cannot be assessed in 
isolation and outcomes have to be judged. 
What emerges is that the success of this policy of economic engagement is at the very 
best mixed. Some good results had been obtained immediately after the Oslo Peace 
Accords. In 1995 for instance the EU-Israel Association Agreement was signed and 
entered in force in June 2000 with the hope that it would also foster economic 
regional co-operation since similar agreements have been signed with a number of 
other countries in the area, but the whole international community and, more 
importantly, the two regional partners were committed to the process. The EU policy 
cannot therefore account for the overall limited success of the early years. It follows 
that when the external and regional actors’ domestic conditions changed, the policy 
faltered. This strategy is not working at the moment and economic conditions in the 
Territories have vastly deteriorated.     
 
This sense of failure is captured when talking to members of non-governmental 
organisations who receive funds from the EU to carry out projects aimed at improving 
the living standards of Palestinians.30 Water sanitation projects, rubbish collection 
schemes, community centres, schools, and other infrastructure have been damaged by 
Israeli armed forces, leading some within the NGO camp to question their own 
activities. Commissioner Patten seemed to share some of their frustration when in a 
statement to the EU Parliament on political progress in the region in September 2002 
when he declared that ‘the Palestinians and the donor community are working hard on 
building institutions and reforming existing structures. But there is a danger of that 
becoming a sort of virtual politics, while the real situation on the ground goes from 
bad to worse to appalling.’31 
 
These poor results do not seem to undermine the support of those who are carrying 
EU policy out in the field. In fact, this overall policy of economic dialogue is quite 
deliberate in its political objectives and once again it can be connected to how the 
European Union formulates its policies on the basis of its values and of its own 
history. Among EU policy-makers there is the assumption that “the EU is very much 
engaged in trying to push an economic agenda based on growth and development 
because of the European experience itself after World War II.” Since there is the 
widespread notion that political success and compromise in conflict situations can 
only be built on economic success, the EU is engaged in following the same path that 
it believes that it followed from its inception. Accordingly, “the logic behind the 
success of the European Union is that it started out as an entity that dealt with 
economic issues and then these tangible results resulted in political progress.”32 If 
economic dialogue is successful, political results are going to be much easier to 
achieve, as both sides will see that they have a common interest in working together. 
While this is considered naïve by some elements working with development agencies 
in the region, it still confirms that norms – albeit idealised - do influence policy.  
 
Building on the belief that economic progress and co-operation can drive politics, the 
EU is very much involved in promoting three core values in its close work with the 
Palestinian Authority: democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. As 
previously underlined, part of the budget of the EU for the region is destined to foster 
political legitimacy and respect for basic civil norms. Through the training of judges 
and the comprehensive reform of the judicial system, it is hoped that in the Occupied 
Territories the rule of law will become part of the political system. 
The overarching logic of this policy of democracy promotion and rule of law is to be 
found in the belief that a legitimate and democratic Palestinian Authority will be more 
prone to co-operate with Israel, as it will have assimilated and will have been 
socialised into the need for compromise and the need to respect other points of view. 
Legal norms are the means through which conflicts can be solved.  
 
The member states of the EU are technically part of this process and their foreign 
policy should also driven by this acquired identity. In fact, there seems to be a very 
strong degree of collaboration between the representatives of the European Union and 
the representatives of the member states. One very senior official stated quite clearly 
that ‘there is no conflict between what the Commission does and what Members 
States do when it comes to deal with the Palestinian Authority and with the peace 
process in general.’33 This co-ordination of policies is also highly institutionalised, as 
there are scheduled meetings and fixed procedures for all the representatives to come 
together. According to some officials, this seems to be a radical change from past 
practice. ‘Every member state sees itself as contributing something both on its own 
(there are a number of different bilateral agreements) and together with other member 
states through the work of the EU Commission delegation.’34 If this is true, two 
important conclusions can be drawn from this. Firstly, socialisation and further 
integration have played a role over time in changing attitudes among policy-makers of 
different member-states vis á vis the role of the EU in foreign affairs.35 While in the 
past Europe may have been seen as an encroachment on what diplomatic corps ‘did 
for a living’, the present would point to a different picture. Not only, the shared 
project of the building of Europe is internalised to such an extent that it modifies 
behaviour, but it spills over into effective policy-making, which in turn is not simply 
based on a notion of sovereignty. Europe does not substitute the nation state and does 
not simply ‘Europeanise’ foreign policies, but represents normative values that have a 
standing of their own. The second important conclusion is that the procedures put in 
place for the co-ordination of these policies enhances the credibility of the EU 
representatives. 
  
However, there is also the emerging belief that EU policies are not simply about 
norms, but that in fact ‘norms are woven into material interests.’36 For example, a 
recent study on the trade accords that the EU signed with countries in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) demonstrated that the promotion of solidarity and 
equality has been scrapped in favour of the pursuit of clear economic advantages.37 
Thus, the EU itself, and in spite of the rhetoric it uses, is not immune from thinking of 
itself has having clearly defined interests.  Secondly, the Union’s Member States have 
significant material interests ranging from access to energy resources to military 
security and from immigration to the promotion of free trade. The novelty of CFSP 
with respect to traditional Foreign Policy may be in the realisation that these material 
interests have to be collapsed into norms in order to be effectively pursued, but this 
does not detract from the reality of member states’ independence, particularly at 
critical junctures and regarding truly relevant matters. All member states have their 
own agendas in the area and their own wider objectives and while, at a rhetorical 
level, this agenda is synergised with the broader European one, a re-edition of the 
‘capability-expectations gap’ seems to be central to understanding.38  
 
These two points contribute to explain the failures of the EU in the area, the lack of 
alternatives to the ‘pax americana’ in the region, and the frustration of EU officials 
who have indeed internalised the EU core norms, but seem to be unable to export 
them successfully. The EU contributes a novel outlook for both the Palestinians and 
the Israelis, but its effectiveness is limited by structural constraints, by the very 
limited and idealised vision of the EU’s own history, by contradictions from within 
the EU foreign policy ‘system’ and by the competition of other more credible and 
effective unitary actors such as the United States. In addition, the targeted partners do 
not seem to be influenced by this norm-exporting strategy and have failed to 
internalise it. The ‘real’ game is for them played with the United States and influential 
member states, not with the EU, which is seen as an economic partner in the more 
traditional ‘realist’ sense.   
 
In the minds of EU officials, the 2003-2004 divisions over the war against Iraq were a 
powerful reminder that not only can the EU be easily sidelined, but that the regional 
partners have understood the very marginal gains they can make by engaging with the 
EU from a normative point of view. All EU policy-makers in the area seemed to be 
very disappointed with the lack of agreement within the EU because the very notion 
of Europe is undermined and credibility diminishes.  
 
US-EU Relations: Loving Me…and Loving You. 
In this context, it is worth mentioning the relationship that has developed in the area 
with the United States. There is little doubt that the US and the EU have different 
approaches to Peace Process, with the US focusing more on security and the EU 
focusing on the socio-economic aspect. This difference derives both from the 
privileged relations that they enjoy with the two parties in conflict, from different 
assumptions they have about the region and, more crucially, from the different 
‘resources’ they can mobilise. The ‘war on terror’ has possibly increased such 
differences, as the current debate on PA funding demonstrates.  
 
For the European Union, the main preoccupation seems to be reaching a type of 
stability, which is not built on security and military preoccupations, but on economic 
and social development. In order to achieve that, the solution of the Palestinian 
conflict is not really about ‘how to guarantee security’, but on ‘how to conceptualise 
and put into practice a different concept of security’. The fact that the EU is 
exclusively focusing on aid and trade is witness to the commitment of the EU to a 
different approach and to the successful export and internalisation of EU norms.  
 
EU policy-makers are careful in emphasising that the EU and the US co-operate in the 
region and that they enjoy very good relations although they deal with different 
matters. This recognition, it is stressed out, does not lead to competition but a useful 
differentiation in roles. Instead of competing with the US in a traditional manner, the 
EU attempts to build a counterweight to Israel ‘through the creation of a democratic, 
efficient and economically sound Palestinian entity.’39  
 
The view is that there seems to be no need to challenge the US because the US listens 
to the EU and the policies they both undertake can be considered complementary. The 
view that the EU and the US do not really compete in the area is borne out when 
talking to NGOs representatives. Paradoxically, many working in the third sector in 
the region are keen to stress two points. First of all, they are quite sceptic about the 
EU line on focusing mostly on economics to foster political progress. They argue that 
the conflict is fundamentally a political one. Even if economic conditions dramatically 
improved and real co-operation was initiated, in the end the rivalry would be so 
intense that economic gains would be short-lived, as the conflict is seen by many on 
both sides as a zero-sum game. The second point is that it is very difficult for them 
not to be sympathetic to the Palestinians and therefore they would call for a much 
stronger role of the EU in competing with the Americans for influence.  
 
There are a number of points that emerge from the analysis of EU/US relations in the 
area. First of all, there is some truth to the claim that the EU and the US are not 
competing and that the EU is not attempting to counterbalance the United States. 
There is a very clear and readily recognised different approach to the Peace Process 
on the part of the two actors, but this ‘competition’ does not seem to subscribe to a 
realist traditional interpretation. In fact, competition takes place on the terrain of 
values. It is believed that a region where the conflict between Israeli and Palestinians 
would be solved though economic co-operation will be a stable one. This ‘human’ 
stability, as opposed to the ‘security’ stability envisaged by the United States, should 
be the best means to defend material interests such as better access to oil resources, 
taming religious fundamentalism and expanding the Euro-Mediterranean free trade 
area with mutual economic benefits.  
 
Secondly, however, it should be recognised that the EU ‘thinks’ in that manner 
because, to a considerable degree, it cannot really do anything else. The structural 
constraints of CFSP signify that the different member states bring to bear their own 
views and interests, jockeying for the position of the spokesperson of the EU. 
Germany and Holland are traditionally pro-Israel and therefore have their own 
independent approach to the whole situation, but on top of that each member state has 
to consider its bilateral relationship with the US when making policies in the region. 
Thus, the EU becomes a ‘nice’ vehicle through which promote specific norms and 
values, but it is not given the means to do anything else because critical decisions 
have to still be made nationally. In turn, this profoundly undermines the identity-
driven policies of the EU and subtracts from its credibility because the regional 
partners are aware that the important game is not really played in Brussels.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Given the deep divisions within the European Union with respect to the war in Iraq, it 
would seem preposterous to talk about the effectiveness of Common and Foreign 
Security Policy and the increasing primacy of EU identity as the driving force behind 
foreign policy.40  
 
However, while rationalist and positivist explanations make a crucial contribution to 
explanations of particular policy choices, it does emerge that EU foreign policy is 
driven at a very fundamental level by the normative values ascribed to it and 
understood by EU and national foreign policy makers. The evidence shows that there 
are grounds to consider the Union operating a normative model as outlined above, 
since EU officials seem to have internalised the norms that Manners identifies as 
being constitutive. In addition, the policies deriving from this may be argued to be at 
least in part identity-driven, even if this identity is partial and highly idealised. 
According to traditional works in the literature on EU policy-making, this should, in 
turn, have an influence on the constituent parts of the EU and how they formulate 
policies that bring a European dimension into an evolving national and collective 
identity. Our evidence, rather, seems to highlight the ineffectiveness of EU policy 
towards the peace process and this can be explained by the Union’s excessively 
idealised vision of itself, which underplays the real-world conditions that underpinned 
its establishment and success. This leads to poor choice of policies because all real 
factors are not accounted for. In addition to this problem, there is a very substantial 
difficulty in turning the norms-drive policies into hard export due to the still 
prominent role that member states play.  
 
The attempt to recast the Middle East in the image of the European Union is real but, 
at this time, the explanatory power of rationalism and the primacy of the nation-state 
remain considerable. According to EU officials, insisting on economic progress and 
economic links is the way forward not only to achieve the regional stability that all 
actors desire, but to obtain a type of stability that is normatively different from the 
traditional security-centred conception of it. However, there seems to be the refusal to 
acknowledge that this is not working. Along the same lines, counterbalancing the 
United States may not be a logical course of action because the normative foundations 
of the European Union are unable to reconcile it with the use of traditional 
instruments of power politics. It could also be said that what makes this policy the 
only one pursued by the EU is the internal divisions of member-sates regarding their 
role vis a vis the US.   
 
A note of optimism is however necessary. While there is only limited evidence that 
the EU is a normative power, the very fact that many officials – from both the EU 
institutions and the Member States – have been able to internalise core norms is 
testimony to the changes that have occurred in national foreign-policy making. In this 
respect, it might be argued that if once again integration accelerates in the domain of 
foreign and security policy – as with, for example, the proposed EU constitution’s 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the External Action Service – further progress in this 
direction may result. ‘Europe has repeatedly defied the sceptics’41 and a truly unified 
CFSP may be the next step of this defiance. This very fact means that progress is 
possible and that international politics does not have to be the arena where the 
scientific law of positivism are immutable. 
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